Not All 737's Are The Same: The MAX Non-Training that killed 100's

Pilots are paid well because there are few other occupations where only one or two people have immediate control over the lives of so many people at a given time. Even the President of the United States has to delegate going to war or attacking an enemy with a cluster bomb. A pilot is the commander in chief of the souls on their airplane which carries a huge responsibility. Pilots must be on their “A” game every time they are in the cockpit. They don't give themselves any room for error. They know they must get it right the first time every time. To do that, they need some basic tools. Self-mental awareness of their state of mind before taking command of an airplane, an airplane that is well maintained and safe to fly, and the training needed to operate that airplane in absolutely any conditions it may get itself into during any given flight without hesitation. Like anything, to be very good at something you must practice it often Well, at the very least, be allowed to practice once.

After doing a lot of digging and hours of research, I found the true reason why the pilots flying the 737-8MAX have had so many problems. It surprised me so much, I did the research twice to make sure I understood it correctly.

Tru Simulation 737-8 MAX Simulator

I spoke with some 737 pilots and found that they were not given nearly the proper training to fly the MAX. The main reason for this, is the total lack of flight simulators to do so. I was able to get my hands on the official FAA list of ALL certified flight simulators in the United States. There is literally only one simulator for the 737-8 MAX in the United States and it doesn't belong to an airline. It belongs to Boeing and is a level D simulator located in Miami. It was designed by the company Tru Simulation who is owned by Textron, Inc (NYSE:TXT).

So that you have a good comparison, I was able to find the simulator list of the three US airlines in question who fly the 737-8/9MAX.

American Airlineshas 60 simulators in total.8 of their sims are 737, but not one is a 737-8MAX Southwest Airlines has 20 simulators in total. All of them are 737 sims, but not one is a 737-8 MAX (Southwest only flies the 737 which is why they don't have any other sim types) United Airlines has 42 simulators in total. 14 of their sims are 737, but not one is the 737-8or -9MAX (United only flies the -9 version)

This is a big deal because it means that the only time the pilots can feel or watch the MCAS system kick in or run through the procedure to disable it, would be live in a real- world scenario at a low altitude above the ground, with people on board. Training instructions fell so short that I found pilots from at leastone major US airline who didn't even know the MCAS system was on the airplane that they were in command of and flying until after the Lion Air crash. Some pilots weren't familiar with the MCAS system until after the Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin #TBC-19 was released to airlines from Boeing on November 6th, 2018 and followed by the Emergency Airworthiness Directive AD#2018-23-51 that was issued on Nov 7th.

737-8 MAX on the top. 737-800 on the bottom

Some may argue that having actual sim time in the

-8MAXversionofthe737isnotthebiggestdealin the world because it's a pretty straight forward procedure to disable MCAS if needed, as it is similar to a procedure that pilots already know called a Runaway Stabilizer (“runaway trim”). However, the - 8MAX is quite different from its predecessors in otherways,asthe cockpits themselves are quite different between the airplanes. As you can see in the photo, the cockpits look different. It is all thesamedatajust in different places than normal.

Let's say you had to drivea car that wasn't yours.When you first sit down,you notice its not like the car you normally drive. The speedometer is now in the middle of the dashboard where the radio is normally located, the gas gauge is now just a small digital number instead of the dial you are used to, and it has been moved above the rear-view mirror next to new headlight control panel. Lastly, the windshield wiper control is now a butt on instead of a handle and now located under the speedometer in the middle of the dashboard.

Tesla dashboard

You would most likely be able to drive the car just fine. You'd need a few seconds to find your way around and it may be tricky and confusing at first to know how fast you are going and how to turn on the headlights after you first sit down behind the wheel. All and all during a normal quick ride to the grocery store you'd most likely be just fine. However, If it started to rain at night, you'd have a hard time finding the new location of the wiper "butt on" and headlight controls. Would that be super dangerous? Probably not too bad since you would most likely pull over, stop, and get a better feel for where everything is located like the windshield wipers instead of doing it on the highway at 60 mph.

A B737 can't pull off and stop! A pilot doesn't get a second to figure it out. Pilots have to know it cold without hesitation or one problem can domino into many others very quickly. Is it dangerous to put a pilot in command of a new airplane, with a new cockpit that's

similar in some ways to the previous cockpit, loaded with almost 200 people on board without at least a little practice to get a feel for where everything is located? Of course, it is.

Engine gauges 737-400 on top of -300

Although rare, engine failures happen, but pilots are trained very well to manage them and fly the aircraft to a safe landing. An engine failure is a condition practiced many, many times in a flight simulator which is why they don't normally result in a plane crash like British Midland 92 did.

British Midland flight 92 was flying the Boeing 737-400 which at the time was just as new to the industry as the 737 -8 MAX is today. Previous 737 models had different engine instruments and different airflow systems than the new -400 model. The new 400 model had only entered service four months prior to the accident.

The 400 had LED engine gauges and an air flow or bleed air system that now drew air from both engines. Previous models only drew bleed air from the right or number 2 engine. The bleed air system is how an airplane stays pressurized by pumping air into the cabin directly from the engines while at the same time an outflow valve releases air from the airplane to maintain the correct cabin environmental balance for everyone on board.

Just like the 737-8MAX rollout, the pilots of flight 92 were not given any simulator flight time because there wasn't a 737-400 simulator for them to train on. So, just like Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 the pilots weren't given any in-cockpit training on the next generation of their airplane, resulting in the deaths of everyone involved. Without practice at something new you might as well be a beginner.

In the case of British Midland 92, the pilots noticed the engine failure and with it they smelled burning coming through the ventilation system into the cockpit. If they had been flying the 100, 200 or 300 models they were used to, then this smell would indicate it was the right or number two engine that was damaged. This is because in the new -400 model aircraft all the air coming into the cabin and cockpit only came from the right or number 2 engine. Now, a pilot surely wouldn't determine an engine failure from only smell and without double checking the engine instruments. In this case, they got confused by the new engine gauges upon which they had been given no simulator time and with that smell bearing down on them, they shut down the wrong engine. They shut down the perfectly working engine partly because they had no training in the cockpit new -400 version of the 737. Should they have been more thorough and have done one more check before shutting down the wrong engine? Yes. They made a giant mistake in not properly communicating with each other in the cockpit to verify the problem and both independently confirming the correct engine to shut down.

However, if they had been properly trained in the new -400 model of their airplane, using a flight simulator, they would've known if they smelled something burning in the air that is being pumped into the airplane, it could be coming from either engine. This would have forced them to confirm the correct engine to shut off. Instead they kept flying

with the good working engine off while instead using the engine that was damaged and as time went on, the engine finally exploded during their final approach resulting in the aircraft crashing short of the runway without enough thrust to make the airport.

British Midland flight 92 crash site, 100 meters short of the runway.

British Midland flight 92 happened 30 years ago and yet the Boeing 737-8MAX was launched, certified, and flying with passengers by pilots who some might argue were set up to fail. By not learning from 30 year old mistakes, the 737-8MAX pilots weren't given much of a chance to disable a faulty system that they didn't even know existed.

Aviation has been very good at adapting and correcting mistakes or problems as they happen, to make sure they never happen again. Therefore, it is surprising that Boeing didn't correct one that they were aware of three decades ago.

The 737-400 is very similar to the previous models and if the engine hadn't failed, flight 92 wouldn't

have crashed. Almost identically today, the 737-8MAX is very similar to its previous generation and if the MCAS system didn't have a problem, flights 302 and 610 wouldn't have crashed. However, if the pilots in command of all three flights had been properly trained on the differences of their aircraft in a simulator ( if one existed), the three crashes would most likely not have occurred.

I questioned a few 737 pilots on just how much difference there is on the -8MAX airplane and if pilots really need a sim ride to be comfortable and safe. Every single pilot I spoke with agreed that even an hour of sim training would be a huge help to show them where things are now located on the displays, the differences between the two aircraft, and that the MCAS system even exists now, how it works, and how to disable it if needed.

Pilots do go through something called "Differences Training". This is when you are Type Rated in one aircraft and then certified in an aircraft very similar. For example, a Boeing 757 is a narrow body twin engine airplane and a Boeing 767 is a wide body twin engine aircraft. One is wider and bigger than the other. However, the cockpits are almost identical, and their systems are essentially the same. So, when a pilot is certified in the 757 they are also certified to fly the 767 after a brief Differences Training class. Th photo to the right shows you the differences and you can see that there aren't many. The Boeing 747-400 and the new Boeing 747-8 only require a Differences Training class to fly them both. Their cockpits are almost identical. The 737Max should require a sim ride and sign off as it is quite different than its predecessors as you can see in the previous photo.

757 on the top. 767 on the bottom.

I wanted to know more about the pilots currently flying the MAX and what complaints or issues came up. One tool I used was the ASRS Database. This is a database where pilots, crew, and ATC can make reports confidentially without any repercussion from their airline or the FAA. They can report everything ranging from a pilot blowing a speed restriction by accident and wanting to

report it, to a flight attendant who couldn't see a flight safety brief as a flying passenger because the seat in front of her was too high. ASRS is designed to learn the problems out there where people would otherwise not report it in fear of their career being jeopardized, co-worker retaliation, or trouble with the FAA. I spent a couple of hours going through this database looking for anything related to the MAX alone.

I was able to find that at least two other incidents occurred with this airplane similar to the two crashes. Both pilots essentially credit the knowledge of the Lion Air crash as the reason their planes didn't crash because they were prepared and did crew briefs ahead of time on what may occur, what to expect, and how to handle it. If they didn't know about Lion they would've been caught off guard and by the time they realized what was happening, it would've most likely been too late as it appears occurred with Ethiopian 302

Below, you will see the list I compiled showing many crew members complaining that they had no training on the new airplane, no time in a simulator to became familiar with new instrument displays, lack of knowledge and material from Boeing, and overall confusion of the crews in the cockpit.

One flight had two crew members on board where neither of them had ever even flown that airplane and had to learn it together with passengers on board. I can almost give an airline a pass if they had a Captain with some 737-8Max flight time go fly with a First Officer with none. I can even give them a pass if the First Officer had time in it, when the Captain didn't. I can't believe they had two crew members where neither were familiar with the new version of

airplane and essentially learning together. Then again, what is expected from an airline when they have

been told by an aircraft manufacture that their pilots don't need more than a quick computer based or iPad-based class about the airplane to be fine.

Now, to keep things in perspective. The odds of anything going wrong on an airplane are so unlikely that walking to your mailbox is more dangerous. Maybe Boeing was banking on that. If so, they had good reason as major airplane crashes have gone way down recently.

The last scheduled passenger airline crash resulting in a passenger death in the United States was in 2013 with Asiana 214 in San Francisco and the last United States registered scheduled passenger airline crash occurred way back in 2009 with Colgan Air flight 3407 in Buffalo, NY. The odds of a crash are

getti ng lower and lower for many reasons.

However, if anything did go wrong on a new airplane with a crew who had never flown that version of the airplane, the odds go way up that it would end badly. From my research I found that the only training, pilots were given on the Max was one class of Computer Based Training or a class using an iPad. Therefore, the first time this crew likely saw the cockpit in person was when they stepped on the airplane to fly it or maybe jump-seat on it.

In conclusion we are left with three things. What happened? Why did it happen? How do we fix it to never happen again?

What happened is something none of us know just yet until Boeing tells us or the United States Senate officially. There are many rumors and leaks, but they are just that, rumors and leaks. However, most likely whatever happened in these cases could've have had a very different result if the pilots had actually been properly trained on MCAS, told it even existed and how to disable it if needed. Airplane crashes are very rarely the result of one thing. They are usually the result of one initial thing and followed by bunch of things like dominoes start to fall. Almost every time, those dominos are stopped in their tracks by highly experienced pilots who are dealing with them and the airplane lands safely. However, if the pilots don't even know a domino has fallen or even exists, like the MCAS failure, what can we expect our pilots to do? So, how do we go from here? Boeing must determine the mechanical problem that started the dominoes falling in the first place. Maybe they fix the software controlling MCAS. Maybe they change the reason this model needs MCAS in the first place. Or maybe they find they need to move the Alpha Vane (AOA) or Angle of Att ack vane to a new location where it isn't getting false information.

Alpha Vane or Angle of Attack Vane

Alpha Vane or Angle of Attack Vane

Only they know what must happen mechanically. One thing is for sure, these accidents were not pilot error. It is certainly possible that the final report will say that if the pilots had disabled the MCAS system or been properly trained on the airplane, they could've done something to avoid the accident. However, is that their fault? No! Once Boeing fixes the mechanical issue or even while they are waiting for decisions right now, they should be cycling pilots in and out of Miami to get an hour of simulator time on the sim at Boeing. In the meantime, the airlines should be ordering simulators from Tru Simulation or whoever they want to have build their own 737-8MAX aircraft simulators. At least that way, the pilots have a fighting chance to know what to do and where to find what they need to do in the cockpit if something goes wrong.

ASRS Database

https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html

Report number - ACN: 1597380

Synopsis- B737MAX Captain reported an autopilot anomaly in which led to an undesired brief nose down situation.

1597286

B737 MAX First Officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after engaging autopilot on departure. Autopilot was disconnected and flight continued to destination.

1593701 can't find their way around

Causal factors were equipment: not much experience in MAX-800, as a result, still have to search for everything.

1593021 (first flight on MAX both pilots)

B737MAX Captain reported confusion regarding switch function and display annunciations related to

"poor training and even poorer documentation”

1593017

B737MAX Captain expressed concern that some systems such as the MCAS are not fully described in the

aircraft Flight Manual.

1590012

B737-MAX8 Captain reported the autothrottles failed to move to the commanded position during

takeoff and climb.

1583028

B737 MAX-8 Captain reported the engine fuel burn was higher than expected.

1555013

B737 MAX First Officer reported feeling unprepared for first flight in the MAX, citing inadequate training.

1538699

B737 MAX pilots reported flying through the final approach course and descending below published altitudes due to confusion with the new style instrument displays.

1495437

B737-MAX Captain reported an unresolved threat of a wingtip strike during crosswind landing and takeoff operations.

1488017

Captain reported procedural issues with the FMS on the 737-MAX in reference to descent capabilities.

1572630

B737 MAX-8 crew reported failing to follow the engine start procedure resulting in an aborted engine start.

Possible design issues that come out during the use of an aircraft which are normal on new

airplanes and fixed over time:

1593699

737MAX8 Captain reported a slot in the cockpit center pedestal allowed flight documents to slip through and collect on aircraft wire bundles (fire hazard).

1583028

B737 MAX-8 Captain reported the engine fuel burn was higher than expected.

1501507

B737 Max First Officer reported that the flight number disappears from the digital display after the aircraft has landed making it difficult to communicate with ATC from landing to the gate.

1495437

B737-MAX Captain reported an unresolved threat of a wingtip strike during crosswind landing and takeoff operations.

1587343

Off duty Flight Attendant reported being unable to see the B737 Max cabin safety demonstration because the passenger seats are too high.